Dialogue on the Generation Z-212 movement in Morocco

 
Protest in Morocco is no longer an exceptional phenomenon, but rather has turned into a familiar social practice that expresses the internal dynamism of a living and interactive society, especially with the public authorities allowing demonstrations, and opening up a space for freedom and expression. We can refer to some official data regarding the number of stops and demonstrations in Morocco, as their number in 2022 reached about 11,874 gatherings and protests, most of which are of a peaceful nature. These numbers reveal that protest expression has become part of the public scene.

If we go back a little, it can be said that the year 2011 represented a turning point in the protest history of Morocco, as Moroccans interacted strongly with the regional wave that spread across the Arab world at that time, as the movement was an exceptional moment in collective consciousness, not only because of the scale of participation, but also due to the way in which the state, led by the royal institution, reacted by dismissing the government, dissolving Parliament, and appointing a committee to draft a new constitution called the 2011 Constitution, which was a moment. From that moment, the protest action became part of the public space, and forms of expression of social and economic demands continued, although most of them were sectarian and limited in scope, including demands for work, education, housing, and social justice.

However, what distinguishes the current moment is that the new wave of protest, which bore the imprint of the Z-212 generation, came in a completely different context, both internally and internationally. First, it is part of a broader global movement that expresses a new generation in the world, described as “Generation Z.” Its movements emerged in countries such as Indonesia, Madagascar, Nepal, and others, where young people took to the streets demanding more just and transparent social, economic, and political reforms. This generation, born in the time of the digital revolution, does not believe much in traditional media, but rather expresses itself through social media networks, and reformulates its political language with new means and youthful cultural symbols that do not adhere to a narrow local framework.

In Morocco, this movement came at a moment when individual frustration intersects with collective anxiety. The vital areas that affect citizens’ daily lives, especially health and education, are witnessing a noticeable decline despite the efforts made. According to indicators, the health sector still suffers from poor equipment and a lack of human resources, while the education sector faces accumulated crises related to its quality and the principle of equal opportunities. With the worsening unemployment, which has reached approximately 12.8% at the national level, and approximately 36% among young people between 15 and 24 years of age, the feeling of closed horizons is increasing, especially among large groups of people with university degrees, among whom the unemployment rate has reached approximately 19%, which has led to a reality that feeds a growing feeling of injustice, and prompts the search for new forms of expression of anger and frustration.

On the other hand, weak government communication has contributed to deepening the gap between the state and society, as the current government headed by Aziz Akhannouch is considered one of the governments least involved in direct public dialogue with citizens. This is due to the predominance of the technical and economic character in its composition, in contrast to the weakness of the political and social sense of many of its members. The current ministers, a number of them do not know any historical political backgrounds or experiences, inasmuch as they constitute a group of legalization and businessmen, who, although they have a role in the development of their sectors, their weak communication capabilities with citizens, makes them “ghost ministers,” as well as excessive interest in major and symbolic projects. This contradiction between the magnitude of material achievements and the smallness of the social impact contributed to fueling a collective feeling that “accomplishment is not seen in the details of citizens’ daily lives.”

Added to this is a state of psychological and social frustration among Moroccan youth, resulting from declining confidence in the future and weak social mobility. Many young people feel that their academic efforts do not translate into real opportunities, and that traditional channels for advancement and recognition have become closed or monopolized. In contrast, huge budgets are allocated to complete major projects within record deadlines, while social projects – such as hospitals and schools – remain slow or incomplete. This disparity in rhythm and attention deepens the sense of injustice and creates a psychological gap between the citizen and the state.

Perhaps what gives the Generation Z-212 movement its uniqueness is its decentralized, networked character, as it does not have traditional leadership or a clear hierarchical organization, but rather relies on the power of symbols and digital spread. It is a movement of expression rather than a framing movement, emerging from phones and screens, and finding in virtual space a real arena for discussion, mobilization, and influence. This new form of protest reflects the spirit of a generation born in the age of the Internet, and speaks in the language of images, hashtags, and short clips, but at its core it expresses deep demands related to dignity and social justice.
The participating youth, despite the recentness of their political experience, expressed a clear awareness of national priorities, according to them, focusing on what they considered a failure to achieve the commitments announced by the current government upon assuming responsibility, especially with regard to improving public services in the health, education and employment sectors. This trilogy has become a central focus in slogans, because it represents the basics that affect the daily lives of citizens, in contrast to a feeling of an absence of balance between investing in major projects and meeting urgent social needs.

However, the nature of the demands and the way they are expressed also reveal deeper features of a growing crisis of confidence between a wide segment of young people and state institutions, especially executive and party institutions. According to national opinion polls, only about a third of young people express their confidence in the government or political parties, but in contrast, the percentage of confidence in the royal institution is remarkably high, as it has a strong symbolic position in the Moroccan collective consciousness. Therefore, it was not surprising that calls were directed from the first days of the protest, asking the king to intervene to “fight corruption and hold government officials accountable for what young people see as the government’s failure in its work during the past four years.” This confirms the political sense of these young people, to turn towards the king, to overcome the slowness of partisan and institutional channels, which also reflects the continued concentration of trust in the head of the state compared to its decline in the rest of the political and executive structures.

The background of this movement cannot be separated from a broader international context known for the emergence of similar protests by Generation Z in several Asian and African countries, where young people express similar aspirations related to social justice, job opportunities, and participation in decision-making. This comparison highlights that the phenomenon in Morocco is not an exception as much as it is an extension of global shifts in protest patterns, as young people have become more organized digitally and less connected to traditional political frameworks, which gives their movement a new character that deserves to be studied as part of a cross-border social dynamic, and not as an isolated local case.

Morocco, according to the 2011 Constitution, is based on a balanced separation and integration of powers, where the royal institution assumes sublime roles related to ensuring the continuity of the state, the balance of powers, and directing major strategic choices, while the government, emerging from the ballot boxes, exercises actual executive authority and bears political responsibility before Parliament and citizens in implementing public programs and improving the standard of living. In this sense, the king is not a daily executive actor in managing public affairs, as much as he is a supreme authority who determines major trends and monitors the proper functioning of institutions within the framework of the spirit of the constitution.

From this standpoint, the evaluation of the outcome of the reform promises that were launched after the 2011 speech cannot be attributed to the royal institution, but rather it is mainly measured by the performance of successive governments since then, which were replaced by different party formations. Young people today do not express disappointment with the reform discourse itself, which still represents an existing national contract, as much as they express a feeling of disappointment at the weak pace of practical implementation of those reforms, especially in sensitive social sectors such as education, health, and employment. While significant progress was achieved in major infrastructure, indicators of access to and quality of public services remained below expectations, creating a gap between promises and tangible reality.

Therefore, what is sometimes interpreted as a return of disappointment is, in essence, a demand to rearrange government priorities and give the social dimension a new breath in line with the royal vision announced since 2011, which emphasized social justice and balanced development. The young people who take to the streets today do not question the royal authority nor the credibility of the reform trend whose foundations were laid in the past decade. Rather, they express the need for a new generation of public policies capable of activating that vision on the ground, ensuring that promises are transformed into tangible gains that the citizen feels in his daily life.

The royal institution in Morocco exercises a directive, supervisory and forward-looking role in accordance with the constitution, while the government has responsibility for the daily implementation of services and improving living conditions through concrete policies and programmes. The royal speech opened a parliamentary session, which is an annual procedure in which the king announces to the representatives of the people the priorities and strategic directions, and not a completely emergency speech to confront popular protests.

However, it cannot be ignored that the speech contained strong references touching on the demands of the youth movement, without referring to it directly. The King called for prioritizing major projects and social and economic programmes, and emphasized the importance of health, education and employment, and the need for a faster pace in implementing local development programmes, taking into account geographical differences, especially in mountainous and marginal areas.

In this formulation, the speech seemed to reaffirm that the protest movement Morocco is witnessing is a normal matter that falls within the dynamism of Moroccan society, and is not an exceptional case or an indication of a severe political crisis that calls for a new transitional phase. Protests, in their various forms, have become part of the public scene, expressing society’s interaction with the government’s performance and its expectations from public policies, within the normal and open functioning of the public sphere that allows expression and accountability.

 
The discourse of this generation does not reflect a radical tendency as much as it highlights a desire for reform from within the national political system, which makes it possible for it to respond positively, especially if the political discourse is coupled with concrete measures that respond to its aspirations in the areas of education, employment, and health, and give it a real sense of the state’s seriousness in implementing its obligations.

We should also not underestimate the size of this protest movement, and consider it a decisive milestone in the future of Morocco. Perhaps the incidents of violence and rioting, the theft of stores, the burning of banks, and the attack on the gendarmerie department, in addition to the way it was portrayed in the media, go in this direction, especially since it occurred in more than one city, whether in the north, south, east, center, or west of Morocco, but it remained limited in terms of time and impact.

In conclusion, it can be said that Morocco was able, as in previous stages, to manage the wave of anger within its natural limits, through a combination of security firmness and political openness. The continuation of public debate, the opening of the public media to different voices, and government statements that reflect a willingness to correct imbalances are all indicators that the state is betting more on dialogue than confrontation. In light of this approach, it is likely that the youth of the movement will tend to engage in the reform dynamic, especially since the legislative and local elections in Morocco will be held in less than a year from now, which could contribute to creating a political environment that leads to the emergence of early electoral campaigns and attempts to attract youth into party organizations, and thus direct the state of anger towards contributing to the escalation of parties and serious figures capable of activating political reform in the country.

For example, the Minister of Health spoke clearly and frankly about the unfortunate events that took place at the Hassan II Hospital in Agadir, where, due to medical negligence and lack of equipment, about eight women lost their lives during childbirth, which was the spark that fueled the protest situation in Morocco, and contributed to confirming the demands of Generation Z at the moment of their discharge on September 27, 2025, as the Minister stressed the disciplinary and investigative measures taken at the hospital, including Although this media appearance was required to show responsibility and response, it took place after street pressure and interaction, which reflects that the communication step came in response to a crisis rather than a proactive initiative, which is what appears to be the case.

On the other hand, the government response was characterized by a combination of openness to dialogue and administrative decisions on the one hand, and security firmness on the other hand. The government declared its readiness for dialogue and to accelerate some projects of a social nature, while the security services sought to respond firmly to the isolated cases of violence that accompanied some nights of protest, which witnessed the deliberate sabotage of a number of shops, banks, and private and public institutions. Which highlights that this approach gives the impression that the tools available to the Moroccan authorities are divided between immediate crisis management tools (investigations, disciplinary measures, security), and slower public policy tools (structural reforms in health, education, and employment) that will determine the extent of the government’s ability to calm the streets in a sustainable manner, and so far they have been successful, especially with the return of calm to the streets, with a limited number of protests remaining.

Therefore, the continued success of this approach depends on the extent to which rhetorical and policy signals are translated into tangible results in basic services and employment opportunities, and on the speed and transparency of implementation. If movements remain limited to rhetoric and symbolic actions without a tangible impact on the ground, the ability of these tools to restore youth confidence and normalize the relationship between the street and the executive institutions represented by the government and its members will remain limited.

Today’s generation is a digital generation par excellence, born and raised in an open communication environment, in which the state or traditional institutions do not monopolize the process of producing knowledge or directing public opinion. These platforms are no longer just tools for communication, but have turned into spaces for organizing, mobilizing, and exchanging symbols and protest speeches, which has provided this generation with unprecedented capabilities to collectively express anger and demand change, far from classic mediating frameworks such as parties and unions.

Therefore, digital media today represent, for the “digital generation,” a new, liberated and open space without any restrictions for informal political participation, through which collective narratives are built and critical awareness of social, economic, and political issues is formed. It enables young people to transcend the limits of censorship, and allows them to redefine public space by producing alternative content that resists dominant narratives and expresses their immediate reality in a language close to them. In this sense, it can be said that these media have become a key actor in directing the movement, as they combined the function of media and the function of symbolic leadership, through their ability to create mobilization momentum and virtual coordination that sometimes translates into organized field protest action.

Protest action in Morocco is not an emergency phenomenon, as I explained previously, but rather forms part of the usual societal dynamic that ranges between symbolic expression and field demands. Morocco has known repeated protest stations for decades on various economic, social, and political issues. What is new this time is that the protest action has been linked to a digital generation that derives its symbols and discourse from cross-border protest experiences, such as in Nepal, Madagascar, Indonesia, and others, benefiting from the communicative openness provided by social networks, without this having yet been translated into building an organizational or field force capable of widespread spread.

Therefore, it appears that the movement, in my view, despite its internal and external media momentum, will remain confined to the virtual space, as its digital leadership does not possess the tools for field framing nor the traditional channels for community mobilization, which makes its ability to move from the symbolic space to collective field action limited, which is what we saw previously, as even the number of demonstrators at the times they call for does not exceed a few dozen, compared to Digital interaction, despite its intensity and speed, does not necessarily mean a readiness for escalation or confrontation in the street, especially since the two nights of rioting that some cities witnessed were quickly brought under control, and the movement’s symbols themselves disavowed them, in an attempt to preserve the peaceful and symbolic character of the movement.

However, two main scenarios can be drawn for the future of this movement. The first is for it to continue in its current form as a digital protest movement that expresses the concern of a new generation about social, economic, and human rights issues, with a decline in its field presence while its moral influence remains in shaping political awareness and public debate, especially after the official interaction that followed the recent royal speech and the hosting of opposition figures and media professionals for discussion of the demands presented. The second scenario, which is less likely in the foreseeable future, is that the movement turns into a broader social wave in the event that economic conditions continue to deteriorate or government responses are weak, which may push the digital generation to go beyond the confines of the virtual space towards more organized forms of field mobilization. However, current indicators tend toward the first scenario, which makes this movement an advanced symbolic expression for a new generation, rather than a mass protest movement that can expand.